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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
lL\ LH Y

DINTRIB UTORS,

INC.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
LOCAL UNION 976, JOINT COUNCIL
67, \\ 7 ESTERN CONFERENCE OF
'rEA~LSTEHS,
INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
Cl LA UFFEURS, \r AREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFLCIO, MILO V. RASH, CLARENCE
LOTT and JOSEPH W. BALLEW,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
10160

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATE:JIENT OF CASE
This is an a1ppeal from Order of the District Court of
8alt Lake County, Utah, wherein on March 23, 1964,
Aldon J ..Anderson, one of the judges of said court, without notiee to the defendants, amended a judgment made
and entered by him on October 30, 1957, by adding inter-
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est thereon at
the judgment.

sro per annum from and after the date of

(a) DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT.

A motion was made in 1said District Court by said

de~

fendants to make and set aside the Order amending the
judgment of October 30, 19~57, which motion, after hearing argument of counsel, was, on May 5, 1964, denied.
(R. 13)
(b) THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL.

Defendants and appellants on this appeal seek a reversal
of the Order or Judgment adding interest to the JudgInent of October 30, 19·57.
(c) ST4TEJJ1ENT OF FACTS. On or about
J·une 28, 1956., Dairy Distributors, Inc., brought an aetion in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County,
Utah, against Local Union 976, Joint Council 67, Western
Oonference of Teamsters, the International Brotherhood
of Team~sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of Ameriea, AFL-CIO, Milo V. Rash, Clarence Lott and
Joseph W. Ballew, Defendants. In its Complaint, plaintiff in ~substance alleges:
That plaintiff is a corporation engaged in buying
and selling Swiss cheese and other dairy products from
the Cache Valley Dairy Association of Amalga, Cache
County, Utah, and transporting and selling the same to
N. Dorman and Company in New York City.
That on or about July 25, 1955, the defendants unlawfully picketed Dorman and Oompany 's premises in
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New York City and by coercion and threats of Local 277,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, induced .and
persuaded ·~mid employees to refuse to handle or unload
from 'plaintiff's trucks the Swiss cheese owned by plaintiff thereby destroying plaintiff's business to its damage
in the sum of $125,000.00. Plaintiff also claimed punitive
damage~s in the sum of $50,000.00. Plaintiff prayer judgment against the defendants in the sum of $125,000.00
together with cos~s. (R. 3)
To the Complaint, defendants in their Answer alleged that the court was without jurisdiction of the subject rna tter or the persons of defendants, and denied
generally the allegations of the Complaint. (R. 4) When
the case came on for trial, the Complaint was amended
by striking the ~negations as to punitive damages. At
the conclusion of the evidence offered on behalf of plaintiff, the defendants jointly and severally moved the court
to dismiss the action and to direct the jury to bring in
a verdict in favor of the defendants. The motion was
taken under advisement. Such motion was renewed at
the conclusion of the evidence and was by the court
denied. At the conclusion of all of the evidence; counsel
for plaintiff moved the court to dismiss the case as to
Rash and Lott, which motion was granted. The jury
brought in five separate verdicts. Each of the verdicts
was for $100,000.00, and was rendered October 29, 1957.
(R. ~4, 25, 26, 27 and 28) The Clerk did not enter any
judgment on the five verdicts rendered, but on his own
initiative signed in typewriting the name of the foreman
of the jury, and entered the following verdict:
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''JUDGMENT ON VERDICT
This action ·came on regularly for trial. The said
parties appeared by their attorneys. A jury of 8
persons was regularly impaneled and sworn to
try said action. Witnesses on the part of plaintiff and defendant were sworn and examined.
After hearing evidence, the argument of counsel,
and instructions of the Court, the jury retired to
consider of their verdict, and subsequently returned into Court, and being called, answered to
their namHs, and say they find a verdict for the
Plaintiff and against the defendant.
'We, the Jurors impaneled in the a hove case,
find the issues in favor of the Plaintiff and against
the Drefendant Local Union #976, Joint Council
#67, Western Conference of Teamsters, The International Brotherhood of Temnsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and HeLpers of America
A.F.L.-C.I.O., Joseph Ballew and assess damage·s
as follows: $100,000.00.'
George J. Barrott
Foreman
October 30
Wherefore, by virtue of the law and by reason
of the premises aforesaid, it is ordered, adjudged
and decreed that said plaintiff have and recover
from defendant the sum of $100,000.00 Dollars
with interest thereon at the rate of - - per cent
per
from the date hereof till paid, together
with said -- and disbursements incurred in this
action, amounting to the sum of $100,000.00
Dollar.s.
Judgment entered October 30 A.D. 1957.
State of Utah, County of Salt Lake ss.
I, Alvin Keddington, Clerk of the Third Judi-
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t'ial District Court of the State of Utah, in and for
tlw County of Salt Lake, do hereby certify that
tlll' l'on'going is a full, true and correct copy of
the judgment entered in the above entitled action.
vVitness my hand and the Seal of said Court,
at ~alt Lake City, this 30th day of October A.D.
1957.
Alvin Keddington, Clerk
Alvin !{eddington, Clerk
By Roy L. I-Iardy, Deputy Clerk''
(.Seal)
(H. 7)

The defendants timely, jointly and severally filed a
motion to have the judgment for plaintiff vacated and
.indgment entered for defendants and each of them, and
if that could not be done that a new trial be granted. The
motion was denied. On January 9, 1958, witholit notice to
any of the defendants, upon a motion of plaintiff, the
judgment against Joseph \V. Bellew was vacated. (R. 8)
Defendants prosecuted an appeal_to the Supreme Court
of Utah from the judgment rendered against them. The
judg·ment was affirmed.
The Supren1e Court of Utah also denied a motion
for rehearing. The decision by the .Supreme Court of
Utah is reported in 8 Utah 2d 124,329 Pac. 2d 414. A copy
thereof is attached to the Remititur. (R. 9) D~fendants
filed in the Supreme Court of the United States a Petition for a \Vrit of Certiorari. The petition was denied.
Thereupon defendant, \V estern Conference of Teamsters
filed a suit against the plaintiff in the United States District Court of Utah, Central Division. In the Complaint
so filed, the proceedings theretofore had were alleged.
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Said Court granted the Western Conference of Teamsters the relief prayed. A copy of the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree is attached hereto in
the Appendix and marked Exhibit A.
Dairy Di·stributors appealed from the above mentioned judgment. The court reversed the judgment of
the United States District Court. A copy of the U.S.
Tenth Circuit Court opinion is attached in the Appendix
hereto and marked Exhibit B. The opinion of the U.S.
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals is reported in 294 Fed.
2d 348.

Western Conference of Team~ters filed a Motion for
Rehearing in the Tenth Circuit of Appeals wherein it
called to the attention of that court the fact that it had
erred in a number of particulars, among which were,
that contrary to the findings of the Circuit Court of
Appeals, the record of all of the evidence taken at the
trial in the Third District Court of Utah was received
in evidence in the United States District Court and also
before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. That it was
admitted in the pleadings of Dairy Distributors filed in
the Federal District Court; that it did not have, at the
time complained of, any kind of permit from the United
States Interstate Commerce Commission to engage in
interstate commerce, nothwithstanding, in its opinion,
the Circuit Court of Appeals found that Dairy Distributors had a permit as a private carrier, and nothwithstanding the Interstate C01nmerce Gommis·sion was not
empowered and does not issue permits to private car-
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rier~.

United :··Hates Tenth CirC'uit. Court of Appeals
denied a hearing· without further comment or opinion.
"\ fter denial of the Petion for Rehearing by the
Cireuit Uourt of Appeals, Western Conference of Team~tl'n' filed a Petition f.or vYrit of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, which was by that
court denied. In the opinion of the Circuit Court of
Appeals it is stated that the Western Conference of
'Peamsters should have brought the suit in equity in
the state court and not in the Federal District Court.
Recause of such statement, Local Union 976, one of the
defendant herein, brought suit in equity against Dairy
Distributors in Cache County, Utah, the place where
said Dair:v Distributors, Inc., was engaged in business.
In such suit, Local Union 976 sought to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment rendered by the Third District
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. In the Complaint in
that suit, the proceedings theretofore had touching the
judgment herein involved were alleged. In that suit,
Dairy Distributor.s moved that the suit be dismissed.
The motion was denied by the District Court of Cache
County. Thereupon Dairy Distributors applied to the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah fo-r a Writ of
Prohibition. In the petition for the writ the title of the
case of Local Union 976 v. Dairy Distributors was not
changed, but the Judge of the District Court of Cache
County, t:tah, was ordered to show cause, on a date
fixed, why it should not be prohibited from proceeding
to hear the case. The Judge of the District Court of
Cache County appeared. After hearing was had . the

11

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.S~reme

Court qf Utah changed the title of the cause
to be Dairy Distributors, Inc., v~s. District Court of
Cache County, and Honorable Lewis Jones, Judge, and
Local Union 976, a labor organization, as defendants.
The Supreme Court of Utah entered its Order permanently enjoining the District Court from proceeding to
hear the cause. Local Union 976 filed a Petition for Rehearing and a Brief in support thereof. In the Petition
for Rehearing a number of claimed errors were alleged
and cited in support thereof. The Petition for Rehearing was promptly denied. 14 Utah 2d 146, 378 Pac. 2d 988.
On October 26, 1962, Dairy Distributors sought to domesticate said judgment of October 30, 1957, against
Western Conference of Teamsters in the United States
District Court for Northern California, which action
W81S dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Thereafter, on or about December 2, 1963, Dairy
Distributors, Inc., brought an action against Western
Conference of Teamsters in the Superior Court o,f the
Stat eof California in and for the City and County of
San Francisco. In that action Dairy Distributors sought
to domesticate the judgment rendered on October 30,
1957, by the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah,
including interest thereon from and after the date of
the judgment at 8% per annum. We~stern Conference of
Teamsters answered, in which Answer it was alleged
that no interest was allowed by the judgment rendered
in the Utah court. The California count ruled that it
would not grant a judgment for interest so long as no
interest was provided f·o·r in the Utah court judgment.
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.. \:-; abon• stated, on j[arch ~;~, 1964, the District Court
of Halt Lake County, Utah, without notice to any of the
defendants, granted the motion made by plaintiff to
amend the judgment made on October 30, 1957, by adding
inten•st thereon at 8)~ per annum on and after the
date of the judgment. On May 5, 1964, the court denied
defendant's Motion to Vacate and Set Aside such amendment. (R. 18) At no time prior to :March 23, 1964, has
Dairy Distributors co1nplained of the judgment entered
on October 30, 1957, being incomplete. On the contrary,
it contended and prevailed in its contention in the Supreme Court of Utah that such judgment should be
affirmed. Prior to March 23, 1964, in all the proceedings
had after the Suprmne Court of Utah affirmed its judgment, Dairy Distributors contended that the Doctrine
of Res Judicata precluded the courts from interfering
with the judg1nent. In compliance with the provisions of
Rule 75 we have directed the attention of the court to
the facts shown by the record on appeal, and also to
~:'Ome additional fa~ts ·which may he deemed material
in disposing of the order or judgment appealed from.

ARGUMENT
Counsel for Dairy Distributors seems to have been
uncertain as to law upon which the action here involved
is based. In its Complaint filed in the District Court of
~alt Lake County, it is not made to appear that the
artion was brought under the Taft-Hartley Act. As
originally drawn the Complaint sought punitive dam-
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ages and judgment against Rash, Lott and Ballew. The
Complaint was amended by striking out the allegations
as to punitive damages.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the action was
dis·missed as to Lott and Rash, but not as to Ballew.
During the month of January 1958, following October 30,
19·57, when the judgment was rendered, such judgment
was dismissed against Ballew without notice. Apparently counsel for Dairy Distributors did not discover
that the Taft-Hartley law did not authorize a judgment
for punitive damages or against the individual members of the Uniori until 1964. However, on March 23,
1964, counsel for Dairy Distributors conceived the idea
that Dairy Distributors were entitled to have intere.st
on the judgment under the laws of Utah, notwithstanding the Taft-Hartley law does not provide for interest.
Unde,r the proceedings had prior to the present oontroversy, particularly the decisions of the Supreme Court
of Utah, of the United States District Court, and the
United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, it is
conclusively made to appear the action was tried and
diSjposed of pur.suant to the Taft-Hartley Act. See Exhibits A and B attached in the Appendix.

POINT I.
IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
OF FEDERAL :STATUTES, FEDERAL, AND NOT
STATE OR LOCAL LAW, APPLIES.
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of the Taft-Hartley Act contains two
l'HhdiYi:-;on~, (a) and (b). Subsection (a) makes it unlnwl'ul l'or a labor organization t·O· engage in or do certain spPcified ads, among which is, that of a secondary
boyoott. Subsection (b) provides that "whoever ·shall
he injured in his business or property by reason of any
,·iolation of Subsection (a), shall reco.ver the damages
by him sustained and costs of suit.'' U.S.C.A. 28, Section
18.~. Our search fails to find a case by a court of last
resort which holds or tends to support the view that a
~tate court authorized to try and render a judgment
in a controversy involving a federal law may add to a
judgment interest on the judgment rendered, which is
either contrary to or not authorized by the federal law
on which the action is based. The adjudicated cases and
the authorities generally condemn such results. Among
the cases so holding are
8l'cfion 187

Chesapeake & Oh,io Railway v. Martin, 283 U.S.
209, 212; De·itrick v. Creamey, 309 U.S. 190, 200;
Brookland Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715;
Board of Commissioners v. United States, 308
U.S. 345, 349; Clark v. H·ot Springs, etc., 76 Fed.
2d (lOth Circuit) 918; lVashington and Georgetou:n Railroad Co., 147 U.S. 571, 589; Pierce v.
U.S., 255 U.S. 398; Briggs Administratrix v.
Pennsylrania R.ailway, 334 U.S. 304.

The authorities are to the effect that "it is very
generally stated that interest is purely of statutory origin and not the creature of the common law, and that
interest should be refused except in such cases as aome
within the terms of the statute unless it has been con-
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traeted either expressly or impliedly, and it has been
said that to determine whether or not interest is to be
charged in a particular case is a mere matter of statutory interpretation.'' The foregoing is quoted from 47
C.J.S., pages 14 and 15. Numerous cases are cited in
footnotes to the text. We shall not undertake the Herculean task of discussing those cases, but under Point
III of this brief we shall discuss the construction that
h~s been placed upon the statutory law and Rules of
Civil Procedure by the federal court and courts ·of Utah.
The fact that thi·s action is under a federal statute and
not the laws of Utah is of importance in determining the
questions involved in this action. It is established law
that when the construction of a state law is involved in
an action brought in a federal court, the construction
placed upon a state law by the court of last resort of
the -state is of controlling importance. By the same
token, an action brought in a state court involving a
federal question, it is a federal law that is controlling.
It was urged by counsel for plaintiff at the hearing
of its Motion to Dismiss the Appeal that interest was
included in the judgment of October 30, 1957, without
provision having been made for the payment of interest
thereon. It was conceded, however, that there is no Utah
case supporting such view. In our search we have been
unable to find a state court which holds that interest is
included in a judgment without expressly being made a
part of the judgment, except where the Constitution or
law so provides. See Hagerman v. Moran, Nov. 1896, 75
F. 97, 21 C.C.A. 242; Section 22 of Article 20 of the Con-
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~fitutinn

o1 Oaliforuia provides that judgments shall
bear interest at 7)'~, notwithstanding the judgment does
not ~o provide. The construction given to judgments
rendered under various federal laws prior to 19·61 touching the question of ·whether interest should or should
not be allowed on a judgment depended on the construction that should be given to the law upon which the judg·ment was founded, that is to say, if the construction of
the law provided that interest may be allowed, the
;judgment should so provide, otherwise not. In addition
to the cases cited heretofore the following case's show
the trend of judicial authority where federal law is involved. Reed v. H owbert, 77 Fed. 2d 277, 10 C.C.A. 1935;
Ora.lJ v. Dukedom Bank, 216 Fed. 2d 108. The Taft-Hartley is silent as to whether or not a judgment such a.s
that here involved is to bear interest. 1 A.L.R. 2d 480, et
seq .. has an excellent summary o.f this problem.

Utah has a statute, U.C.A. 1953, 68-3-3, whcih provides that
''No part of these revised statute.s is retroactive
unless expressly so declared.''
..:\ number of cases are cited in footnotes to the text
among which is J(ansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 129
Fed. 2d 287. Needless to say, the act above quoted was
not intended to affect the judgment here involved. Indeed it is elen1entary that the law making branch of
government may not lawfully amend a judgment.
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U.C.A. 1953, 15-1-4, provides:

"Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract
shall conform thereto and shall bear the interest
agreed upoh by the partie·s which shall he specified
in the judgment, other judgments .shall bear interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum."
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 54( e), in part provide-s that:

''The Clerk must include in any judgment
signed by him any interest on the verdict or dire·ction from the time it was rendered.''
The language of the Rule just quoted is clear and as
such not ·subject to be construed as meaning that interest is included in a judgment without being stated in
the judgment. The maxim '' Expressio unius est exclusio
alterious ", is e~specially applicable where as here a
court is called upon to construe a law.
35 C.J.S. 341, and cases cited in footnotes to the

text. By requiring that interest must be included in the
judgment such language excluded a construction that
the judgment included interest even if silent as to
interest.
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l)OIKT II.
IF

TIIJt~

FAILURE TO INCLUDE INTEREST
1~ Tfllt~ .JC1H;I\IJ1~~T OF, OCTOBER 30, 1957, WAS
lNTENrl LO~AL IN THE BELIEF THAT INTEREST
~llUlTLD ~OT BE GRANTED, SUCH JUDGMENT
:\L\ Y ~UT BE LA \YFULLY AJ\IIENDED TO INCLUDE INTEREST.
1

The law dealing with the amendments of a judgment a~ to intere~t is thus stated in Freernan on Ju.dg11/CIIfs, 5th Ed., Vol. I, page 301, section 153:
··To be subject to correction by amendment
nl'tcr the judgment has becon1e final, errors, with
respect to interest, must be merely clerical or an
inadYertent mistake. Judicial error awarding or
withholding interest or not stating the amount of
it, rendering judgment, like other judicial error,
is not properly an1endable. ''

.A number of cases are cited in footnote in support
of the text.

No evidence was -offered in this ca·se which shows
that the fRilure to include interest in the judgment was
not intentional.

POINT III.
IJ.i, DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS EVER HAD A
RIGHT TO IIA VE IXTEREST ADDED TO THE
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JUD·GMENT OF OCTOBER 30, 1957, IT HAS LOST
SUCH RIGHT BY THE AFFIRMANCE OF SAID
JUDGMENT WITHOUT INTEREST BY THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH AND BY THE DECISION
OF THE UNITED STATES TENTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS.
In 1936 Congress enacted a law which permitted the
Supreme Court of the United States to relax the common law with respect to when the court may amend its
judgment. Some changes were 1nade in the Rule of Civil
Procedure, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United
States after the Rules were first adopted. Rule 60 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure assumed its present
form in 1948. A history of Federal Rule 60, together
with cases a-pplying the Rule is contained in U.S.C.A. 28,
pages 121-174. Federal Rule 60, as it has existed since
l 948 provides as follows :
"Relief from Judgment or Order. (a) Clerical
Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, order's
or other parts of the record and errors therein
arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such
notice, if any, as the court orders. During the
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the
appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal
is pending may be ~so corrected with leave ·of the
appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Disco;vered Evidence; Fraud, Etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
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court may relieve a party or his leg·al representative I' rom a final judgment, order or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) Inistakes, inadvertPHee, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
diseoYered evidence which by due diligence could
not lwve been diseovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other miscond,uct of an
adverse party; ( 4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have pPospective application; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The nwtion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3)
uot more than one year after the judgment, order
or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
This rule does not limit the power of a court to
l'ntertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to
g·rant relief to a defendant not actually personally
notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C. Para. 16!55,
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
C\lnrt. \Y rits or cormn nobis, corain vobis, audita
querela, and biUs of review and bills in the nature
of a bill of review, are abolished, and the proce..
dure for obtaining any relief from a judgment
shall be by nwtion as prescribed in these rules or
by an independent action.''
~-\mong the cases construing and applying Federal
Hule 60, is the case of llotne Indemnity Co. v. O'Brien,
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112 Fed. 2d 387, decided in 1940. It is there held that
notwithstanding the law provides for interest on judgment, if the trial court failed to expressly grant judgment· for interest on said judgment, and appeal is bad
from such a judgment and the judgment is merely affirmed the trial court to which the n1andate or remititur
is returned may not amend or alter such judgment so
affirmed by the appellate court. The view is there expressed that the trial court may not look to the provision
of the law with respect to intereist, but is bound to follow
the direction of the mandate of the appellate court. A
number of cases are cited in that opinion which were
decided prior to the aoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure in which it is held that a trial court may not
change or amend a judgment which has once been affirmed by an appellate court unless the trial court is,
by the opinion, granted authority to make ·such change.
That the matter of disallowing interest even if provided
for by law is not a clerical error but an error of substance and as such controlled by provision of Rule 60(b)
above quoted, which rule does not confer upon district
courts the power to alter or amend a judgment affirmed
by Circuit Courts of Appeals of the United States. See
Gray v. Dukedom Bank, supra, and Wesco Food Co. v.
Demase, 100 Fed. Supp. 386.
The. law announced in the Home Ind·emnity Company
v. 0 'Brien, supra, has been approved and followed in the
case of Briggs Administratrix v. Pennsylvania Railway,
supra, and the cases there cit·ed; als·o, in the case of
Clark v. H'ot Springs, etc., supra.
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The fullowiug Utah C<l~L·~ snpport or tend to support
tlw lnw tllnt i[ nn Hppl'llate court ~n;-;tains a judg1nent
ot' t IH· trial c·ourt whi<'h is silL•nt as to interest, the trial
('lllll'l i~ without jurisdidion to amend the judgment by
nddi ng· illll· n·st to the jnclg-rnent:
Rl'ece \'. Kuott, 3 Utah 431, 24 Pac. 24 Pac. 757;
Y. U.P. Ranu·ay Co., 7 Utah 510, 27 Pac.
(i!>3; Keller Y. Chounws, 95 Utah 31, 79 Pac. 2d
S(i; Da Nouclt Y. District Court, 95 Utah 227, 79
Puc. ~J 1006.
~Viclwls

POINT IY.
_.\.NY RIGIIT TI-IAT DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS
jL\. 'l 1L\ VE HAD TO .A1IEND TI-lE JUDGMENT O:B,
OCTOBl~H 30, 1957, \Y.AS AND IS BARRED BY THE
PBUVl~lON8 OF RULE 60, UTAI-I RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE.
In tlw case of Lees

Freeman, 19 Utah 481, in construing the provisions of the Law of Utah of 1888, the
:--iupn'llll' Court of Utah held that notwithstanding such
law provided that a judgment 1nay be a1nended upon a
proper showing within six months after judgment was
tendered, the court lost jurisdiotion to make amendment:3 after the expiration of the six months period.
Y.

In the case of Frost v. D,istrict Court of the Fifth
Jurlirial District, 83 Pae. 2d 737, 96 Utah 106, decided in
1!l:~~. it i~ held that a judgment may not be altered after
the time fixed hy law in n1atter of substance notwith:--tnnding the trial c·ourt indicated in its opinion that a
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judgment other than actually entered should be made.
In 1950, pursuant to act of Legislature, the Supreme
Court of Utah adopted a Code of Civil Procedure which
in the main is an adoption of the rule.s theretofore adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States. Indeed,
the rules indicate that the Rule.s of the United States are
to become the rules of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Subdivision (a) of Utah Rules is copied verbatum from
Rule (a) of the Federal Rule above quoted. Subdivision
(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
"(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may in the futherance of justice relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistage, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly di·scovered evidence which by
due dilig~nce could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) ;
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party; ( 4) when, for
any cause, the summons in an action has not been
personally served upon the defendant as required
by ;Rule 4( e) and the defendant has failed to
appear in said action; ( 5) the judgment is void;
( 6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospe·ctive application; or (7) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment. The motion shall be made within
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u reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3),
or (4), not more than three months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
takmt. A nwtion under this subdivision (b) does
not affect the finality of a judgment or ·suspend
its operation. This rule does not limit the power
of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proeeecling or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon
the court. The procedure for <>btaining any relief
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed
in these rules or by an independent action.''
It is familiar doctrine as stated in the third edition
of Sutherland au Statu.tory Construction, Vol. II, Page
551, Sec. 5209:

"Where the Legislature of a state has used a
8tature of another state or country as a guide for
the preparation and enactment of a statute, the
courts of the adopting ·state will usually adopt the
eonstruction placed on the statute in the jurisdiction of its adoption. The reason usually given for
this rule is that in adopting the statute, the Legislature is presumed to have adopted the construction which has b_een put on the statute by the
courts of the state of its adoption.''
It will be observed that Subidivison (b) of Rule 60
of the State Rttles is substantially the same as the Federal Rule. It therefore follows that when the state court
adopted Subdivision (b) of Rule 60, it adopted the pro" ision of the construction placed thereon by the federal
courts, particularly the case of Home Indemnity Company v. O'Brien, supra, which was decided in the year
1940, and remained the law at the time the State Ru1es
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of Civil Procedure were adopted, and is still the established federal law as shown by the cases heretofore cited.
It, therefore, follows that when the Supreme Conrt of
Utah and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment rendered by the Third District Court of
Salt Lake County, Utah, the trial court was bound by
the judgment so rendered and may not ignore the mandate or direction of the appellate courts.
POINT V.
IF DtAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., EVER HAD
A RIGHT TO HAVE INTER.EST ADDED TO THE
JUDG:NlENT RENDERED ON OCTOBER 30, 19,57,
IT LOST SUCH RIGHT BY REASON OF THE FACT
THAT IT DID NOT SEEK: TO HAVE SUCH AMEND~IENT MADE WITHIN THE TIME FIXED BY
RULE 60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
It will be seen that under Rule 60 (b) "the motion
to arnend a judgment must be rnade within a reasonable
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3) or (4) not more than
three months after the judgment, order or proceeding
was entered or taken." It will be seen that a period of
six years and about five months elapsed fron1 the time
the jltdgment was taken until the rnotion was made to
amend that judgment. It would seem obvious that an
amendrnent adding about 52jr to the amount of the
judgment rendered by the judgment of October 30, 1957,
ir-; a very substantial amendment. \Ve ·shall not add to
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the eases so holdiug because the law announced in the
<'ases heretofore cited hold that interest added to a
judgment i~ a substantial amendment.

POINT VI.
THE DOCTRINE OF THE ESTOPPEL OR RES
JUDICATA PRECLUDES THE COURT FROM LAWFULLY ADDING INTEREST TO THE JUDGMENT
RENDERED ON OCTOBER 30, 1957.
Upon the appeal frorn the judgment rendered in the
District Court o.f Salt Lake County, Utah, on October 30,
1957, it was argued at length that such judgment was a
proper and valid judgment. The Supreme Court of Utah
so held. In the proceedings had before the United States
District Court, the United States Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals and in the suit brought in the District Court of
Cache County, Utah, it was argued that the defendants
were precluded from questioning the validity of the
judgment rendered on October 30, 1957, under the doctrine of res judicata. It was not until six year.s and
about five months after that judgment was rendered
that the claim was made that such judgment was wrong
and that it did not provide for interest. Obviously, the
doctrine of res judicata binds the plaintiff as well as the
defendants. Erickson v. Slomar, 94 Fed. 2d 437, 440;
lVebcr Y. Hertzell, 230 Fed. 965; Lovejoy v. Murray, 70

U.S.1.
The law seems uniform in holding that the doctrine
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of res judicata applies to all parties to an action and
those in privity with such parties.
We quote the following from the opinion rendered
in the action in which plaintiff herein was the appellant
in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals:
"Whether its judgnwnt was right or wrong it
stands unassailed and is binding upon the parties.
Any other view would create uncertainty by undermining the conclusive character of judgments
and would permit the revival of litigation once
terminated; consequences ·which it was the very
purpose of the doctrine of res judicata to avoid."
For the reasons stated and sub1nitted, the judgment
or order appealed from should be reversed with costs.
Respectfully submitted,

CLARENCE BECK:
ELIAS HASEN
BRUNDAGE, HACKLER
& ROSEMAN
By JOHN J. DUNN
Attorneys for Appellants

Dated this ........................ day of August, 1964.
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.\PPENDIX FI~DI~OS

EXHIBIT A

OF FACT AND CO~CLUSIONS OF LAW

This cause came on regularly for trial on the 26th
day of May, 1960, before the court sitting without a jury.
()ounsel for the re>spective parties appeared and evidence
was offered in support of the pleadings of the respective
parties. The court having heard the evidence and duly
considered the same now makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
I. The plaintiff, is, and at all times herein mentioned wa~, an unincorporated association with its principal place of business at San Francisco, California; the
defendant is a corporation organized puDsuant to the
laws of the State of Utah, with its principal place of
business in Utah; the matter in controversy herein exeeeds the sum of $10,000.00.
II. The defendant Dairy Distributors, Inc., brought
an action for damages in the District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, against the plaintiff, Western
Conference of Teamsters, and several other defendants,
based upon the claim the defedants entered into a conspiracy to induce and encourage the employees of N.
Dorman and Company not to handle any shipments of
good-s transported by Dairy Distributors, Inc., to the
said X. Dorman and Company contrary to the provisions
of the "Labor ~Ianagen1ent Relations Act, 1947. '' De-
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fendant Dairy Distributors, Inc., clairned that in this
(dfort to so influence said employees, the defendants enlisted the aid of Teamster Local 277 of New York City,
which represented the said employees of N. Dorman and
Company, and pursuant thereto, certain early morning
picketing of defendant's truck occurred on July 26, 1955,
at or near the premises of the said N. Dorman and
Company.
III. The action in the District Court of Salt Lake
County was tried commencing October 23, 19·57, and following a jury verdict in favor of Dairy Distributing, Inc.,
judgment was rendered on October 29, 1957, ag·ainst the
plaintiff Western Conference of Teamsters and all the
other defendants, except the defendants Rash, Lott and
Ballew, in the sum of $100,000.00, which judgment was
affiirmed by the Utah Supreme Court.
IV. The purported service of process upon 'Vestern
Conference of Teamster.s in the aforementioned state
courte case wa.s had upon one Joseph Ballew. The court
:finds that at the time the said Joseph Ballew was so
served he was a stranger to 'V estern Conference of
rreamsters in that he was not an employee, officer, general
agent or other agent of this plaintiff herein nor had he
ever been, por was he at that time or ever authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service for or in behalf.
of the plaintiff herein. Plaintiff 'Yestern Conference of
rreamsters 1 during all times mentioned in the state court
uCtion, had no property in the State of Utah, neither did
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it. have, nor did it hold istelf out as having, an office or
place of business in the State of Utah.
V. The court finds that at no time mentioned in
defendant's state court action, nor at any other time
during its existcuee, did the plaintiff, Western Conferuwe of Teamsters, exist for the purpose, in whole or
in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievance·s
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
YI. The court finds that plaintiff, Western Conference of Teamsters, did not negotiate with employers
respecting conditions of work and labor in behalf of
employees, at any tin1e mentioned in defendant's state
court action or at any other time.

VII. The court finds that plaintiff, Western Conference of Teamsters is not and never has been an organization in which employees participate respecting hours
or conditions of work and labor or an organization in
which employees are eligible to n1embership or affiliation,
within the Ineaning of the "Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947. ''

YIII. The court finds that defendant, Dairy Distributors, Inc., laid its claim to recover and brought its
action in the state court under and pursuant to the proYisions of Section 303 of the "Lahor Management Relations Act, 1947. ''

IX. At all times complained of in the state court
action the defendant, Dairy Distributors, Inc., was en-
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gaged in interstate com1nerce as a contract carrier by
motor vehicle, hauling cheese from Utah to New York
and hauling various other items from points in the East
and Midwest to Utah. There was no evidence in the state
court record, nor in the record here, that the defendant,
Dairy Distributors, Inc., had a certificate of convenience
and necessity from the Interstate Commerce Commission
to engage in said trucking operation. There was, however, affirmative evidence in the state court record, and
in the record here, and counsel for defendant admit, that
defendant, Dairy Distributors, Inc., did not have such
a permit, and such is the finding of this court. The engaging in interstate commerce without .such a permit
constitutes a criminal offense as provided in Title 49,
Section 322, U.S.C'.A.
X. That the basis of the verdict and judgment in
the state court was that the acts of picketing complained
of and the damage resulting therefrom was caused by a
conspiracy between the party who did the picketing and
Local Union 277, whereby such Local Union 277 and its
members who were the employees of the said N. Dorman
and Company .were induced to resfuse to handle and
process the cheese that was to be delivered to N. Dorman and Company by the defendant Dairy Distributors,
Inc.
XI. That on the 25th day of Octo her, 1955, the
defendant herein, the Cache Valley Dairy Association,
General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board
and the above mentioned Teamster's Local Union 277,
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onlt>red into a Stipulation and Agree1nent as contained

in plaintiff's Exhibit "1'' in this cause.
XII. That thereafter on D~ecember 15, 1955, the
National Labor Relations Board made and entered its
Decision and Order as set out in Exhibit "E" attached
to the Complaint on file herein.
XIII. That pursuant to the foregoing order the
above mentioned Local Union 277 posted notice to all of
its member N.employees of N. Dorman and Company, a
copy of which notice is attached to the Complaint as a
part of Exhibit "E ".
XIY. That thereafter pursuant to the above mentioned Agreement and Stipulation and the Order and
Decision of the National Labor Relations Board, the
United States Circuit Court of Appea1s for the Second
Circuit made and entered its Decree as set out in Exhibit
XY. That pursuant to the above mentioned Dooree
of the United States Circuit Court, the above mentioned
Loeal Union 277 caused to be posted a notice, a copy of
which is a part of the Decree as set out in Exhibit "I''
of plaintiff's Complaint herein.

XYII. The claim ·of damage for the destruction of
the business of plaintiff in the State court case, and the
verdict and judgn1ent rendered therein was bas·ed on a
threat. by the defendants, in concert with Local 277, of
~m inducement to concerted action by the employees of
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N. Dorman and Company to cease handling the products
delivered by Dairy Distributors, Inc., at the time of, and
following, the picketing of business in New York City.
Said judgm·ent was predicated upon a continuing and
future concerted action on the part of the e'mployee
members of· Local 277 to refuse to unload said vehicles
from said date as might be induced from tin1e to time
by the defendants in the State court in concert with Local 277 and in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act. This
court finds that upon entering into said Stipulation and
the entering of said Order·s the said conspiracy terminated and such threat of Dorman's employees not to unload such products there by ceased.

* * * *
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Fro mthe foregoing facts, the court now makes and
enter.s these, its Conclusions of Law:
1.

This court

ha~s

jurisdiction of this proceeding.

2. The enforcement of the State court judgment
against the plaintiff should be enjoined for the following
reasons:
(a) The State court failed to obtain jurisdiction of
the person of the plaintiff, Western Conference of Teamsters.
(b) 'rhe state court failed to obtain jurisdiction of
the ·s~bject matter of the action because the plaintiff
herein is not and was not a labor organization within
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the definition and meaning of Section 2(5) of the Labor
~lanagement Relations Act, 1947, and is therefore exempt
and immune form liability under Section 303 of this Act.
(c) The State court judgment was a recovery for
injuries to an illegal business which was operating in
\'iolation of the laws and policy of the United State.s, and
its enforcement should be obtained to protect the interests of the United States, its citizens and the transportation of goods and merchandise in interstate commerce.

• • • •
3. .A judgment should be rendered herein enjoining the defendant from enforcing the above entitled
judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 109069 in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, against
this plaintiff, and plaintiff should have a judgment for
its costs incurred herein.
4. Let judgment be entered accordingly.
Dated this 14th day of October, 1960.
Willis W. Ritter
United States District Judge
Filed Oct. 11, 1960.

JUDGMENT AND DECREE
This cause came on regularly for hearing on the
:26th day of May, 1960, before the court sitting without
a jury. The court having heretofore made its Findings
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of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being now fully
advised in the premises :
Now, therefore, it i.s ORDERED, ADJUDGFJD AND
DECREED that the defendant herein be perpetually
enojined from enforcing its judgment against the plaintiff herein which was rendered by the District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in Case No. 109069 on
the 29th day of October, 1957.
It is further Ordered that the plaintiff herein have
its costs herein incurred.
Dated this 14th day of Oct., 1960.
By the Court:
Willis W. Ritter
United States District Judge
Notation of entry of J udgrnent made in civil docket
on October 17, 19·60, inaccordance with Rule 79· of Rules
of Civil Procedure.
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.._\PPE~DIX

-- EXHIBIT B

United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July Term, 1961

D. .\IRY

DISTRIBUTORS, INC., )
Appellant,
DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., No. 6629

I

\\'ESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMAppellee.
STERS,
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

Arthur A. Allen (Hanson, Baldwin & Allen ~ere with him on the
brief) for Appellant.
Elias Hansen (Clarence M. Beck and A. Park Smoot were with him
on the brief) for Appellee.
Douglas McHendrie (John F. Mueller and Grant, Shafroth, Toll and
McHendrie were with him an the brief) for Amici Curiae.
Before PHILLIPS, PICKETT and LEWIS, Circuit Judges.
LEWIS, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is taken from a decree of the District
Court for the Dlistrict o.f Utah which perpetually enjoined
Dairy Distributors, Inc. from enforcing a judgment for
$100,000 obtained against the \Y estern Conference of
Teamster~ in the state courts of Utah. Appellant's basic
contention of error is that the United State District
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Court has but relitigated issues fully detern1ined in the
state court action and has premised the injunction upon
findings of fact and conclusions of law that are in simple
disagreement with the findings and conclusions of the
state court. The United States District Court so says
appellant, has undertaken to sit in appellate review upon
a ,state court case after that case has been set at final
rest by the Supreme Court of Utah. Appellee defends
the issuance of the injunction upon the ground that the
federal district court has correctly found that the state
court judgment was without jurisdictional foundation of
either person or subject matter and upon issues involving a federal question. We will hereafter refer to appellant here and plaintiff in the state court action as the
Company and appeUee here and defendant in state court
as We~stern Conference.
The factual background of the controversy as it
developed and reached the state courts of Utah is fully
set forth in the opinion of the :Supreme Court of Utah.
See Dairy Distrtibutors v. Lo,cal Union 976, 8 Utah 2d
124, 239 P. 2d 414, cert. den. 360 U.S. 909. In brief, the
action was brought by the Company to recover for damages occasioned by Local Union 976, Joint Council 67,
Western Conference. The International Brotherhood of
Team.sters, and others, through conduct prohibited by 29,
U.S.C.A. 187 (.Sec. 303, Labor Management Relations
.Act, 61 Stat. 158).1 Jurisdiction of such a cause of action
1

29 U.S.C.A. 187 .

.. (a) It shall be unlawful, for the purposes of this section only, in an
industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organi7;ation to engage
in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in,
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is granted to state courts having jurisdiction of the
parties by Sec. 30:~ (b) of the Act. Jurisdiction also specifically lies in the district court of the United States.
Among the defenses advanced by Western Conferenec in the state court action were the claims that service
of process was invalid and that the state court lacked
juvisdiction of the subject matter as it applied to Western Conference. Specifically, Western Conference contended that it wa1s not a labor organization as that term
is included in the provisions of the Labor Management
Act.» Both issues were decided adversely to We,stern
Conference in the state trial ·court and presented to the
Utab Supreme Court on appeal. That high court held,
329 P. 2d 414 at 419:
"Defendant's Point II contends that the Western Conference of Teamster's is exempt from this
litigation, not being a labor ·organization within
the contemplation of Title 29, Sec. 152(5) U.S.C.A.
There is evidence in the reeo·rd to indicate that
a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object
thereof is.. (1) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed persons to
join any lobar or employer organization or any employer or other person
to cease using, seling, handling, transporting, or· otherwise dealing in the
products of any other producer, processer, or manufacturer, or to cease
doing business with any other person;
.. (2) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bar~
gain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless
such labor ·organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provision! of section 159 of this title;

'Sec. 2(5), 29 U.S.C.A. 152(5) .
..The term 'labor organization• m_eans any . organization of any kind,
or any agency or employee representatiOn committee or plan, in which em~
p)oyees. parti_cipate and which exi~ts for. the purpose, in whole or in part,
of dealmg wtth employers concermng gnevances, lbaor disputes, wages rates
of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."
'
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Western Conference of Tean1sters had jurisdiction over local teamster unions in the 11 western
states; that Local 976, of which Rash was an
officer, was affiliated with the Western Confer~
ence, and that it in turn was affiliated with the
International Union. Under such circumstances
we cannot say that the Western Oonference of
Teamsters was not a labor organization under
the broad definition of the act."
But both iHsues were found by the United States
Di,strict Court in favor of Western Conference as follow:
''IV. The purported ~service of process upon
Western Conference of Teamrsters in the aforementioned state court case was had upon one
Joseph Ballew. The court finds that at the time
the said Joseph Ballew was so served he was a
stranger to Western Conference of Teamsters in
that he was not an employee, officer, general agent
or other agent of the plaintiff herein nor had he
ever been, nor was he at that time or ever authorized by appointment nor by law to receive rService
for· or in he half of the plaintiff herein. Plaintiff
Western Conference of Teamrsters, during all
times mentioned in the state court action, had no
property in the State .of Utah, neither did it have
nor did it hold itself out as having, an office or
place of business in the State of Utah, nor did it
do any busine~ss in the State of Utah.''
"VII. The court finds that plaintiff, Western
Conference of Teamsters, is not and never has
been an organization in which employees participate re~specting hours or conditions of work and
labor or an organization in which employees are
eligible to membership or affiliation, within the
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nwaning of the ''Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947 '."
The grant of jurisdiction to state courts to try and
dt><'ide certain issues under the Labor Management Act
('arries with it the inherent power to interpret the Act
and to decide factual matters necessary for the proper
and laful administration of the Act. The grant of such
jurisdiction to state courts and the similar grant to the
United States District Court does not contemplate a
dual remedy or a dry run in either court. It does contemplate a finality of determination in either juri,sdiction
of every proper issue presented. The rule is not altered
nor weakened by the event that the is,sue may reach the
field of jurisdiction when that subject is detpendent upon
fact affecting per.son or subject n1atter. The issue of jurisdiction must reach finality the same as any other issue.
Lewis Y. Carver, 10 Cir. 237 F. 2d 516; .&merican Surety
of New York v·. Baldwin, 267 U.S. 156, 53 S. Ct. 98, 77 L.
Ed. 231; Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66,
60 S. Ct. 44, 84 L. Ed. 85. Here, Western Conference entered the state court to litigate the issue, among others,
of the validity of the service of process upon one Ballew
(or Ballou) as an agent of Western Conference. The
state trial court, upon consideration of evidence which
is neither before us nor was before the United States
District Court, determined Ballew to be an agent of
\Vestern Conference and accordingly found a valid serYice of proces·s upon Western Conference. This judgment was affirmed against direct attack in the Supreme
Court o Utah. Had this issue originated in the United

41

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

States District Court our present review would have concerned the evidence viewed by the federal trial court as
demonstrating that no such agency existed. But we make
no such review. On a similar contest of jurisdiction, the
United States Supreme Court has held:
''The substantial matter for determination is
whether the judgment amounts to res judicata on
the question of the jurisdiction of the court which
rendered it over the pers-on of the respondent.
It is of· no moment that the appearance was a
special one eXJpressly saving any submiBsion to
such jurisdiction. . . . The special appearance
gives point to the fact that the respondent entered the ~1issouri court for the very purpose of
litig~ting the question of jurisdiction over its
person. It has the election not to appear at all.
If, in the absence of appearance, the court had
pro·ceeded to judgment and the present suit had
been brought thereon, respondent could have
raised and tried out the issue in the present action, because it would never have had its day in
court with respect to jurisdiction ... It had also
the right to appeal from the decision of the Missouri District Court, . . . It elected to tallow
neither of those courses, but, after having been
defeated upon full hearing in it contention as to
jurisdiction, it to~ok no further steps, and the
judgment in que~stion resulted." Baldwin v. State
Trapeling Men's Association, 283 U.S. 522 at 524,
51 S. Ct. 517, 75 L. Ed. 1244.
We think it clear that the determination of the Utah
court that it had juri,sdiction over the person of Western
Conference through the ~service of process upon one
found to be an agent of Westenn Conference is res judi-
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eata of that issue. The necPssity of examining the question of agency is often the pivotal point in determining
juri~diction of either person or subject matter and can
and does form the premise of the do?trine of res judienta as between state and federal courts. In McCarthy v.
State, et al., I Utah 2d 205, 265 P. 2d 387, the Supreme
Court of Utah applied the principle of finality of judgment where the federal court had earlier considered the
claim of agency of state officers acting under the compulsion o.f a state statute. The federal court had dismissed
the action because the named individual defendants were
not the real parties in interest. Such ruling required a
determination of agency and an interpretation of a .state
~tatute. The action was then filed in the state court and
was di·smissed as being res judicata. In affirming this
dismissal the Utah Court stated:
''The issue was settled by the F·ederal Court,
as hereinabove indicated, and it was not the prerogative of the State District Court nor of this
Court ou appeal to review or reverse that decision. \Yhether its judgment was right or wrong,
it stands unassailed and i~S binding· upon the parties. AnY other view would create uncertainty by
undermining the conclusive character of judgments and would permit the revival of litigation
once terminated; consequences which it was the
very purpose of the dcortine of res judicata to
avoid.''
\Yestern Conference stenuously urges that it is not
a labor organization within the bounds of that term as
defined in the Labor-:Management Act and that a deter-
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ruination to the contrary in a state court cannot be res
judicata upon such an issue. The ruling does, of course,
require a determination and application of fact to an interpretation of Sec. 2 ( 5) of the A·ct and the correctness
of such rulings is of utmost importance in the administration of the Act. But adequate protection against the frustration of federal law by unsound interpretation or application in state courts lies in the power of the Supreme
Court of the United States to review by certiorari the
judgments of state supreme courts upon matters of federal O·r constitutional law. In Norris v. Alabama, 294 U..S.
587, 55 S. Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074, the power and duty is
recognized by Mr. Justice Hughes thus:
"That the question is ·one of fact does not relieve us of the duty to determine whether in truth
a federal right has been denied. vVhen a federal
right has been specially set up and claimed in a
State court, it is ~our province to inquire not
merely whether it was denied in express terms
but also whether it was denied in substance and
effect. If this requires an examination of evidence,
that examination must he made. Otherwise, review by this Court would fail of its purpose in
safeguarding constitutional rights. Thus, whenever a conclusion of law ·of a state court as to a
federal right and findings of fact ars so int.erIningled that the later control the f,ormer, it is
incumbent UJpon us to analyze the facts in order
that the appropriate enforcement of the federal
right may be assured.''
In the instant case certiorari was sought and denied
by the Supreme Court of the United States from the
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judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah. Such denial
does not pstablish the correctness of the particular judgment but Sl'l'VPs only to establish the finality of the judgment as between the particular parties. The ·same issue
('annot be renewed by initiation of an action in the United
States District Court.
Amici Curiae join \V estern Conference in 'arguing
that it has now been admitted that the appellant company·
held no certificate of public convenience and necessity
required by the Interstate Commerce Commi~ssion as a
condition to doing business as an interstate contract
carrier ;3-that the evidence demonstrates that the appellant was operating an interstate trucking business without authority; and that for these reasons appellant
should be denied enforcement of its judgment.
The Interstate Commerce A·ct does not provide for
court action for Yiolation of the provi~sions of that act,
but does provide, 49 U.S.C.A. 13(1):
'' ( 1) Any person, firm, corporation, company
or association, or any mercantile, agricultural, or
manufacturing society or other organization, or
any body politic or municipal organization, or
any COinii}On carrier complaining of anything
done or omitted to be done by any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this chapter in contraYention of the provisions thereof, may apply

8-fhe opinion of the Supreme Court of Utah may indicate that that
Court considered this point upon an erroneous assumption of fact. 329 P.
2d 414 at 420. If so, the proper remedy lay in urging the Utah Court to
~ correct such error. We consider the contention only because from the record
before us and the opinion of the Supreme Court of Utah we cannot clearly
1: determine whether the Utah court considered and acted upon the issue.
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to said Commis·sion by petition, which shall
briefly state the facts; whereupon a statement of
the eomplaint thus made shall be forwarded by
the ·Commission to such Ctommon carrier, who shall
be called upon to satisfy the complaint, or to answer the same in writing, within a reasonable
time, to be specified by the Commission. If ·such
common carrier within the time specified shall
make reparation for the injury alleged to have
been done, the common carrier shall be relieved
of liability to the complainant only for the parti·cular violation of law thus complained of. If
such carrier or carriers shall not satisfy the complaint within the time .specified, or there shall
appear to he any reasonable ground for investigating said complaint, it shall be the duty of the
Commis·sion to investigate the matters complained
of in such matter and by such means as it shall
deem proper.''
and, 49 U ..S.C.A. 12(1):
"(1) The Commission shall have authority, in
order to perform the duties and carry out the
objects for which it was created, to inquire into
and repo-rt on the management of the business
of all eommon carriers subject to the provisions
of this chapter, ... The Commission is authorized
and required to execute and enforce the provisions
of this chapter; and, upon the request of the Commis·sion, it shall be the duty of any United States
attorney to whom the Commission may apply to
insi{itute in the proper court ... all necessary proceedings for the enforcem·ent of the provisions o.f
this chapter and for the punishment of all violations thereof.... ''
It is clear that the matters of interstate transporta-
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tion of goods were entrusted to the Commission by Con~ress and the role of the courts in the administration of
the policies is limited to enforcing, enjoining, setting
a~ide, annulling or suspending orders o.f that body, 28
l'.H.C.A. 1336, 28 U.S.C.A. 2321, 49 U.S.C.A. 16. The
nword here indicates that the Cmnmission has licensed
the appellant as a private carrier; no complaint of this
uction ha~ been made to the Commission; and if damage
a rose as a result of improper licensing or improper use
of the g-ranted certificate, it is not apparent .
..\ppellee has not cited us to a ,case where such a defense was interposed in a court action sounding in tort,
nor do we think such defense proper. The commission
has the facilities and powers to investigate all such mattNs and is charged with the responsibility of administeringfi the ~\ct in all its facets. The courts may not usurp
its ,power in the guise of determination o.f a civil suit.
Finally, "\\'"estern Conference contends that is was
deprived of the opportunity of defending, in full, the
state court action because of extrinsic fraud prepetuated
by the Company. This contention was presented to the
state trial court by post-trial motion and was there rejected. It was also presented to the United States District Court and was similarly rejected. Fraud is within
the doctrine of resjudicata, eiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S.
7:2G, 66 S. Ct. 853, 90 L. Ed. 970, and can serve as a premi~e to avoid a state court judgment only when it is preSt'Bted to a federal court as an original issue. llere, even
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as an original issue, the claim was found to lack merit
by the court below. We find no error in the finding.
Reversed and remanded with directions to vacate
the injunction.
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